Now that the dust is settling in Bangladesh in the wake of the unceremonious resignation of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her hasty departure to India, there are issues that need clarity before the world – and immediate neighbour India – can design a policy response to these developments. First, let us be clear that hubris was the primary force behind Ms Hasina’s political fate.
She certainly rode roughshod over Constitutional norms and conventions. Her sacking of Bangladesh’s first Hindu Chief Justice Surendra Kumar Sinha was just one example. The disproportionate use of violence by the security forces against protesting students was another. The fact that the Awami League, a party founded by her father Sheikh Mujibur Rehman which was once a bastion of secularism, intellectuals, progressive thought, and Bengali pride, was widely seen as having been taken over by contractors, big businesses, and middlemen on her watch was perhaps the final straw.
But let us also resist the South Asian tendency to see the world in binaries. Ms Hasina cracked down on terrorism, made the first genuine effort at deradicalisation of the population, was a friend to India while protecting her own country’s interests, balanced the China-US jostling for influence over Bangladesh with aplomb, ensured the army stayed in the barracks, and helmed her country’s journey from a low-income country to an aspirational middle-income one adroitly.
The Hasina Administration formulated policies and initiated structural reforms that diversified Bangladesh’s economy which is overly dependent on the manufacturing and export of garments. Indeed, even in the garment sector, a concerted attempt to make Bangladesh an integral part of Global Value Chains was evident through her years in power and was paying dividends. Economically, the past 15 years have been best for Bangladesh since its Independence in 1971and have seen the maximum number of people lifted out of abject poverty.
Sheikh Hasina won her fourth consecutive (and fifth overall) General Election in January 2024, though the victory was clouded by reports of widespread irregularities by neutrals and allegations of outright rigging by the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami as well as the main Opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) of Khaleda Zia which boycotted the poll.
The US had anyway been supporting the ‘Hasina-must-go’ narrative over the past few years as Washington was thought by many analysts to be getting increasingly restless because of the independent foreign policy being followed by Dhaka. Great power rivalry the strategically critical Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is intense, and the Bay of Bengal, with Chinese influence in neighbouring Myanmar dominant, is a geography that the US is desperately seeking to gain a foothold in.
Hubris may well have set in for the Hasina Administration before her 2024 electoral success due to its own actions but, and this is the key, her adversaries comprising the BNP, Islamists, and the US also realised that time was running out for them as Ms Hasina had consolidated her hold on power.
Soon after her poll win, the former Prime Minister announced reservations for the descendants of freedom fighters who had given up their all in Bangladesh’s Liberation War. Students across the country not affiliated with the Awami League were infuriated because despite the increasing prosperity in the country, government jobs – the holy grail for employment seekers across the Indian subcontinent due to deeply embedded socio-cultural reasons – threatened to become scarce for all other sections of the population. (Government jobs in South Asia are the only guarantee of job security, and health, educational, and pension benefits.) Imagine, if you will, the anti-Mandal Commission agitation in India of 1990 for a rough comparison.
As temperatures soared over the summer months and the students’ stir intensified, Ms Hasina’s opponents seem to have decided that they had the perfect foil in the student-led protests against the quota to foment trouble for the government. Each for their own reasons, of course:
The non-Awami League students’ organisations because they felt a genuine sense of grievance at the dwindling opportunities such an affirmative action policy would lead to;
- The BNP because their supporters would be largely if not wholly excluded from the quota given the marginal role played by their progenitors in the country’s freedom struggle;
- The Islamists because such a policy would underline Bangladesh’s privileging of its Secular-Bangla traditions over the Islamic-Urdu identity sought to be imposed on the country by Pakistan and its acolytes ever since the Partition of India in 1947 and;
- The Americans because they wanted security and intelligence gathering facilities in Bangladesh which the Hasina administration was being ‘uncooperative’ about, especially giving the US untrammelled access to the strategically important St Martin’s Island.
It was the perfect storm. To her eternal credit, however, not only did a combative Sheikha Hasina push back against this multipronged attack on her, she even reached out to the student leaders in a televised interaction and asked them bluntly: If not for freedom fighters’ kin, whom should reservation be for, the Razakars (collaborators with Pakistan who gained infamy for murders, rapes, and targeted killings of minorities and secular-liberal Muslims during Bangladesh’s the freedom struggle)?
But it was too late to shape the narrative, especially given her own mistakes in terms of her autocratic functioning, the corruption indulged in by those around her, and her capture of state institutions. History will, however, record that when it came to the crunch, she left Bangladesh for refuge in India rather than be the cause of more bloodshed.