Most people believe that China’s obsessive romance for Pakistan is driven by its desire to use it to keep India under tenterhooks and disrupt the Indian growth story to the extent possible. This is true because India is gradually emerging as an economic competitor to China.
But there are three other reasons that are equally important. The most important reason is Beijing’s fear that Islamic fundamentalism and militancy would spill across the border to China’s Xinjiang region which has a vast Muslim population. Muslims in Xinjiang are not just suppressed, they are kept in a vast and open prison, their activities constantly watched and scrutinized by security forces. This has been established in reports produced by the United Nations Human Rights Group and Amnesty International.
The $60 billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), part of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s pet Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) program, has enabled China to build direct relationships with military commanders, local politicians, businessmen and even militant groups operating in areas close to the Chinese border. CPEC involves massive local spending that allows funds to percolate different segments of the Pakistani elite and enhances Chinese influence. This influence building activity has ensured that terror groups stay away from the border and do not influence Muslims in the Xinjiang region.
The third reason involves future business prospects linked to CPEC, a 2400 km long corridor of road and railways crisscrossing Pakistan from the Chinese border to the Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea. China has financed and built this port in Balochitan province of Pakistan to serve as an alternative sea route to the Strait of Malacca which connects the Andaman Sea (Indian Ocean) and the South China Sea.
The idea is to carry Chinese goods all the way through CPEC to the Gwadar port for shipment to the Gulf and other parts of the world. However, the port has not proved to be useful so far despite heavy investments in building it, and dredging the sea next to it. On top it, the rebel Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has been regularly destroying assets and attacking Chinese engineers and workers working at the site.
Nearly 81% of Pakistan’s arms export comes from China. Pakistan is the main testing ground and the biggest export market for China made weaponry that includes fighter jets and missiles. The recent India-Pakistan conflict provided a unique opportunity for China’s arms makers to test their weapons in real combat situation, and obtain feedback for future improvements besides demonstrating the products to the international arms market. China is the fourth biggest arms exporter and hopes to take forward this business.
Pakistan is also useful in China’s quest to build relationship in the Muslim world and wean them away from U.S. influence. China has invested heavily in copper and other mines in Afghanistan and is not competing with the U.S. for influence with the ruling Taliban in Kabul. Pakistan is connected by land to Afghanistan and serves as a conduit for China.
Chinese diplomats recently held talks in Kabul and proposed to extend CPEC to Afghanistan. The idea is to obtain contracts for infrastructure projects under the BRI program in Afghanistan. This will put it in direct competition with India which is engaged in several projects in Afghanistan.
Most important, President Xi has staked his personal prestige on CPEC and in the future of Pakistan. Pakistan’s economic failures pose two-fold challenge to Xi. Islamabad would not be able to repay loans if it is unable to earn foreign exchange. Besides, Pakistan’s economic failure would convey a negative message about China’s BRI program to its customers across the world. Xi desperately wants to see an economic revival in Pakistan for his own reasons.
This is an important reason why China supports Pakistan’s case at the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Financial Actions Task Force and the United Nations. But the recent armed conflict has taken Pakistan backwards and increased its indebtedness.
